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INQUIRE=DOC18D
ITEM NO=00417034
ENVELOPE
CDSN = LGX185 MCN = 92196/21044 TOR = 921961524
OTTCZYUW RUEKJCS6130 1961527-CCCC--RUEALGX.
ZNY CCCCC
HEADER
O 141527Z JUL 92
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEKCCG/USDP-CCC WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
O 141518Z JUL 92
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1405
RHEHOND/ONDCP WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNA/DEAHQS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RHLBAAA/USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJR-SA//
RUWMEGA/USSOUTHCOM HOWARD AFB PM//SCJ3-DDD//
BT
CONTP JLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 011254

DEA HQS FOR A, AD, DO, AO, OF, OFL, OC
STATE FOR ARA/AND, INM
ONDCP FOR R. PORTER
NSC FOR R. BEERS
USSOUTHCOM FOR J-5

E.O. 12356: N/A

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
TAGS: SNAR, MASS, BL
SUBJECT: COUNTERNARCOTICS (CN) AIR ASSETS FOR BOLIVIA

REF: A) LEVITSKY-BOWERS TELECON 7-8-92, B) LA PAZ 10191

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ON THE BASIS OF INCREASING SUCCESS THROUGH GHOST ZONE IN CONTROLLING CHAPARE AIRSPACE AND THE DISPERSAL OF TRAFFICKERS FLIGHTS TO THE NORTH AND EAST, THE COUNTRY TEAM CONFIRMED JULY 9 THAT THIS IS THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO IMPLEMENT THE LONG-STANDING PROVISION OF FMFP ANNEX III, ORIGINALLY ESTABLISHED IN 1990, TO REFURBISH T-33'S:
-- THESE AIRCRAFT WILL ESTABLISH A CAPABILITY WHICH DOES NOT CURRENTLY EXIST TO PERMIT THE FAB TO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IS/FPC/CDR Date: 5/26/95
[X] RELEASE [X] DECLASSIFY
[ ] EXCISE [ ] DECLASSIFY IN PART
[ ] DENY
[ ] DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions
MR Cases Only:
EO Citations
TS authority to:
[ ] CLASSIFY as [ ] S or [ ] C OADR
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INTERCEPT FASTER MOVING HIGH FLYING TRAFFICKER AIRCRAFT.

-- ON THE BASIS OF OUR INTERDICTION NEEDS, WE HAVE COMPLETED ANNEX III NEGOTIATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH THE GOB TO PROVIDE AN INITIAL REFURBISHMENT OF ONLY TWO AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE SUCCESS OF THIS APPROACH.

-- WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO PROCEED WITH ACQUISITION OF SIX ADDITIONAL HELICOPTER ASSETS IN FY93, PROVIDED SUFFICIENT FUNDING WERE AVAILABLE, WHICH IS CURRENTLY NOT THE CASE (OUR PROGRAM WAS CUT FROM USD 40 MILLION TO USD 25 MILLION AND MANY HIGH PRIORITY PROGRAMS, INCLUDING THE HELICOPTERS, HAVE FALLEN BELOW THE AVAILABLE FUNDING LINE). AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, AND THOROUGH CONSULTATION WITH OUR BOLIVIAN ALLIES, WE HAVE DETERMINED THAT PRIORITY MUST BE GIVEN NOW TO ESTABLISHING THE T-33 LONG-RANGE INTERDICTION CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO CONTINUE GHOST ZONE SUCCESS. END SUMMARY.

GHOST ZONE AIR INTERDICTION SUCCESS

3. THREE PC-7'S HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED IN OPERATION GHOST ZONE EFFORTS TO ENFORCE AN AIR CAP OVER THE CHAPARE. THEIR PERFORMANCE HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY ARE A VALUABLE ASSET IN INTERCEPTING AND TRACKING SLOWER-MOVING TRAFFICKER'S ASSETS (PRIMARILY CESSNAS). INTELLIGENCE ACQUIRED IN JULY PROVES, HOWEVER, THAT TRAFFICKERS ALREADY ARE EMPLOYING SWIFTER AIRCRAFT, SUCH 'S AEROCOMMANDERS, WHICH CANNOT BE CAUGHT BY THE PC-7.

4. THE AIR INTERDICTION STRATEGY FOR BOLIVIA CALLED FOR A PHASED THREE STEP DEPLOYMENT OF AIR INTERDICTION ASSETS. IT BEGAN WITH HELICOPTERS WHICH PROVIDED SHORT-RANGE TRANSPORT CAPABILITY, FOLLOWED BY PC-7'S WHICH PROVIDED A MEDIUM-RANGE TRACKING CAPABILITY APPROPRIATE FOR SLOWER MOVING TRAFFICKING AIRCRAFT. ADAPTATION BY TRAFFICKERS TO THE SUCCESS OF GHOST ZONE NOW REQUIRES THE FAST TRACKING CAPABILITY OF T-33'S.

5. THE HIGH SPEED AND LONGER RANGE OF THE T-33 WOULD MAKE IT AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF OUR AIR INTERDICTION STRATEGY. FROM SANTA CRUZ, FOR EXAMPLE, T-33'S COULD SUPPLEMENT THE PC-7'S IN CHIMORE BY INTERCEPTING HIGHER FLYING OR FASTER MOVING AIRCRAFT IN THE NORTHERN AND EASTERN AIR ROUTES TO BRAZIL AND PERU OUT OF RANGE OF THE PC-7'S. USING THE T-33'S WOULD ALSO HAVE A DETERRENT EFFECT ON TRAFFICKERS; WHETHER

INTERCEPTED OR NOT, THEY WOULD HAVE TO ADJUST FLIGHT PROFILES TO AVOID THE T-33'S. AS TRAFFICKERS ADAPT TO PC-7 OPERATIONS AND MORE AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE PLATFORMS (E.G., P-3'S, BECOME AVAILABLE, WE WILL NEED AN AIRCRAFT THAT CAN RESPOND QUICKLY TO POSSIBLE TARGETS. IN ADDITION, REFURBISHED T-33'S WOULD ALLOW THE GOB TO EXERCISE MORE CONTROL OVER ITS AIRSPACE, ANOTHER ASPECT OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY INSTITUTION-BUILDING. WE ESTIMATE THAT IT WILL TAKE APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR BEFORE TWO T-33'S CAN BE FULLY REFURBISHED TO OUR STANDARDS TO TEST THE HIGH SPEED CN-INTERCEPTOR CONCEPT.

NEGOTIATION OF ANNEX III:
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/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
6. WHEN WASHINGTON ADVISED POSTS OF THE UNEXPECTED AVAILABILITY OF ADDITIONAL UH-LH HELICOPTERS IN FY92, WE JUMPED ON THE OFFER, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THE INCREASED TEMPO OF AIR OPS IN BOLIVIA WOULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL HELICOPTER SUPPORT WHICH OTHERWISE WOULD NOT BECOME AVAILABLE UNTIL FY93. IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO US INITIALLY THAT THESE HELICOPTERS WOULD BE CHARGED TO FMFP. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE WERE STUNNED BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT FY92 FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR BOLIVIA WAS CUT FROM USD 40 MILLION TO USD 25 MILLION. THE UNEXPECTED COSTS OF THE HELICOPTERS COMBINED WITH THE DRASTIC CUT IN FMF FORCED US TO REVIEW PLANS FOR FY92 EXPENDITURES AND REPRIORITIZE OUR NEEDS BASED ON THE NEW, LOWER FIGURE.

7. WHILE THIS REVIEW WAS UNDERWAY, WE ALSO WERE NEGOTIATING THE FY92 COUNTERNARCOTICS FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE ANNEX, WHICH AMENDS OUR BASIC BILATERAL COUNTERDRUG AGREEMENT, WITH THE GOB. THIS YEAR, WE MADE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO MORE FULLY INVOLVE OUR BOLIVIAN COUNTERPARTS IN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS. WE WANTED THE FINISHED PRODUCT TO GENUINELY REFLECT MUTUALLY AGREED OBJECTIVES AND PLANS FOR FY92 FMFP SPENDING THAT WOULD FULFILL THESE OBJECTIVES. WE ALSO WANTED THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY TO BE FULLY INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATION AND PRIORITY ESTABLISHING PROCESS TO 1) CONTRIBUTE TO INSTITUTION-BUILDING AND 2) HELP PLACATE A MILITARY (PARTICULARLY THE ARMY) STILL JEALOUS OF CN AID TO THE POLICE AND STRUGGLING TO FIND A REALISTIC PEACETIME ROLE. THIS IS IN KEEPING WITH OTHER OVERALL GOALS OF STRENGTHENING BOLIVIAN DEMOCRACY AND ENHANCING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.

8. THE GOB INSISTED THAT, IN FY92, WE HONOR A COMMITMENT IN THE AIR STRATEGY AND IN THE ANNEXES OF PREVIOUS YEARS TO REFURBISH T-33 AIRCRAFT ALREADY IN THE BOLIVIAN INVENTORY AND INTEGRATE THEM INTO THE FLEET OF COUNTERNARCOTICS AIR ASSETS.

9. IN SUM, ON JULY 9, THE COUNTRY TEAM CONFIRMED THE NEED TO GIVE FY92 FMF PRIORITY TO REFURBISHING T-33'S INSTEAD OF ACCEPTING ADDITIONAL UH-LH'S BASED ON THE FOLLOWING POLITICAL, MILITARY AND COUNTERNARCOTICS FACTORS:

-- OUR BUDGET WAS CUT BY ROUGHLY 40 PERCENT TO USD 25 MILLION AND MANY KEY PROGRAMS HAD TO BE SET ASIDE;

-- OUR LONG-STANDING COMMITMENT TO REFURBISH T-33'S TO TEST THE CN-INTERCEPTOR CONCEPT;
-- THE NEED FOR A HIGHER SPEED AIRCRAFT TO SUPPLEMENT THE EXISTING PC-7'S AND SUPPORT AEW (AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING) ASSETS;

-- THE FACT THAT THE T-33'S WERE ALREADY IN THE BOLIVIAN INVENTORY; REFURBISHING THEM WOULD HELP THE GOB LEARN TO BETTER MAINTAIN ITS OWN ASSETS AND WOULD ALLOW THE GOB TO BETTER CONTROL ITS AIRSPACE AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED INTRUSION BY TRAFFICKING AIRCRAFT (INSTITUTION-BUILDING);

-- THE NEED TO SUPPORT, WHERE POSSIBLE, FUNDING PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED BY THE GOB AFTER A FRANK, REALISTIC, BILATERAL APPRAISAL OF CN NEEDS AND CAPABILITIES (ALSO INSTITUTION-BUILDING);

-- THE NEED TO BALANCE, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, GOB CIVILIAN AND MILITARY POLITICAL INTEREST (I.E., GIVE THE MILITARY MORE OF A ROLE AND MORE OF A SAY IN CN PRIORITY ESTABLISHING).

10. THE POLITICAL, MILITARY, COUNTERNARCOTICS AND BUDGETARY JUSTIFICATION FOR THE T-33'S IN FY92 DOES NOT DIMINISH OUR NEED FOR ADDITIONAL HELICOPTERS IN THE FUTURE. GIVEN CUTS IN FY92 FMFP, HOWEVER, WE SIMPLY CANNOT DO IT ALL. IT IS THE CONSIDERED JUDGEMENT OF THE EMBASSY AND THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE T-33 PROGRAM IS THE RIGHT PRIORITY. BOWERS
ADMIN
BT

#6131

NNNN